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Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income
inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dy-
namic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed
by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes
and subsidies designed to beneﬁt the poor. Corruption is reﬂected
in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in
providing false information to the government. In accordance with
empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between
corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between cor-
ruption and development.
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11 Introduction
The World Bank has identiﬁed corruption - in particular, public sector cor-
ruption - as the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development.1
Corrupt practices on the part of politicians, civil servants and legislators
can distort resource allocations, exacerbate income inequalities and under-
mine growth prospects. Moreover, such practices can create their own self-
sustaining momentum by strengthening the very incentives that give rise to
them in the ﬁrst place. Many countries of the world appear to be plagued
by these forces, having seemingly become trapped in a vicious circle of wide-
spread poverty and wholesale misgovernance. To most (if not all) devel-
opment experts, the ﬁght against corruption is of paramount importance if
these countries are to escape from their predicament. In spite of these ob-
servations, there exists relatively little theoretical work on the relationship
between corruption and development. This is no doubt due to the complex,
multi-dimensional nature of this relationship which makes it necessary to
consider economic outcomes as reﬂecting the broader social, political and
insitutional environments in which private and public agents operate. Nev-
ertheless, economists are now equipped with the tools and techniques that
could be used to meet this challenge, lending rigour and precision to the
arguments involved. Our objective in this paper is to make such a contribu-
tion.2
Generally speaking, public sector corruption refers to illegal, or unautho-
rised, acts on the part of public oﬃcials who abuse their positions of authority
to make personal gains. One manifestation of this is when civil servants, or
bureaucrats, exploit their powers of discretion, delegated to them by the
government, to further their own interests by indulging in clandestine rent-
seeking activities.3 Essentially, corruption arises because the government and
bureaucracy are involved in a principal-agent type relationship from which
the latter may gain in a manner that contravenes the interests and rules of
the former. Most theoretical work to date has been directed towards under-
standing the microfoundations of this relationship, using partial equilibrium
models to focus on speciﬁc questions and issues about the nature of cor-
1For an appreciation of the importance of corruption to international policy makers,
see the World Bank and IMF web-sites, www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt and
www.imf.org/external/np/exp/facts/gov.
2There are many excellent reviews of the existing literature on corruption and devel-
opment: see, for example, Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001), Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Tanzi
(1998).
3This is referred to as bureaucratic corruption, as distinct from political and legislative
corruption (e.g., Jain 2001).
2rupt practices and the implications for eﬃciency and welfare (e.g., Banerjee
1997; Carrillo 2000; Klitgaard 1988, 1990; Rose-Ackerman 1975, 1978, 1999;
Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Relatively little research has been undertaken
from a macroeconomic perspective with the view to modelling the dynamic
general equilibrium interactions between bureaucratic malfeasance and eco-
nomic development.
Empirical work on corruption has been ﬂourishing over the past few years.
This has been due to the construction of several cross-country data sets
that are widely regarded as providing reliable measures of corrupt activity.
These data sets, or corruption indices, have been compiled by various in-
ternational organisations (most notably Business International Corporation,
Political Risk Services Incorporated and Transparency International) from
questionnaire surveys sent to networks of correspondents around the world.
There is a strong correlation between these indices which give very similar
rankings of countries in terms of the extent to which corruption is perceived
to exist. Their publication has led to a rapid accumulation of evidence on
the causes and consequences, incidence and importance, of corrupt behaviour
within society’s public institutions.4
One of our concerns in this paper is the relationship between corruption
and inequality. In the contemporary literature on income distribution two
approaches may be singled out as being especially prominent. The ﬁrst -
exempliﬁed in the contributions of Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and
Newman (1993), Blackburn and Bose (2003) and Galor and Zeira (1993) -
emphasises the role of capital market imperfections in determining the extent
to which individuals can borrow and invest, and the extent to which initial
inequalities may either vanish or persist over time. The second - instanced in
the work of Alesina and Drazen (1991), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Perotti
(1993) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) - stresses the importance of political
considerations in inﬂuencing redistributive policy, indicating how inequality
may aﬀect growth by creating pressures to either implement or postpone
diﬀerent types of public programme. Upto now, the integration of corrup-
tion into a theory of income distribution has eluded the attention of most
researchers. Yet there are good reasons for believing that corruption has
important distributional eﬀects which result in the poor becoming poorer
and the rich becoming richer. Two recent examples of this are presented
by Ahlin (2001) and Foellmi and Oechslin (2003) who develop occupational
choice models in which at least some private agents must bribe public oﬃcials
in order to engage in entrepreneurial activity that would make them better
4For more detailed discussions of the indices, see Jain (1998), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)
and Treisman (2000).
3oﬀ.5 Both analyses predict that an increase in the size of bribe payments
leads to a redistribution of wealth among the population. In the case of
Ahlin (2001) this result arises because those agents who have to pay bribes
(agents who lack political inﬂuence) are deterred from becoming entrepre-
neurs and, instead, operate as workers whose wage is lowered by the increase
in labour supply to their occupation.6 T h et o t a lv a l u eo fb r i b ei n c o m e( a
measure of corruption) displays an inverted u-shaped relationship with in-
equality. In the case of Foellimi and Oechslin (2003) the result is obtained
because those agents with lower initial wealth are less able to put up the
required amount of collateral against which they can borrow (due to capital
market imperfections) in order to ﬁnance the ﬁxed cost of setting up busi-
ness.7 A high incidence of corruption is associated with a polarisation in the
income distribution.
In what follows we present an analysis of inequality that focuses on the
role of corruptible bureaucrats (as opposed to populist politicians) in deter-
mining the scope of redistributive policy (rather than occupational mobility).
In principle a government could eliminate inequality without harming growth
through an appropriate system of lump-sum transfers and public expenditure
programmes administered by a subservient bureaucracy. But even if a gov-
ernment had such an objective and was able to design such a system, its
policy could still ﬂounder were bureaucrats not so passive but actively en-
gaged in pursuing their own hidden agenda. Corruption in public policy is
often seen as one of the prime causes of persistent inequality. It can lead
to both a bias in the tax system in favour of the rich and a deterioration of
social programmes designed to beneﬁt the poor. Tax evasion by the wealthy,
in collusion with bureaucrats, reduces the tax base and makes the tax system
more regressive so that the burden of taxation falls disproportionately on the
non-wealthy. Moreover, for any given tax system, tax evasion implies a loss
of revenue to the government which may be forced to cut back on its expen-
ditures targeted to the same group of low-income citizens (such as payments
of subsidies, spending on health, and funding of education). The availability,
provision and quality of social programmes may be threatened even further
through the increased costs of accessing these programmes when bribes are
demanded, through the diversion of resources towards other activities that
5A third analysis by Glaeser et al. (2002) focuses on the distributional aspects of
legislative (as opposed to bureaucratic) corruption. It is shown how inequality may both
cause, and be caused by, subversion of legal institutions by the rich and powerful.
6The reduction in wages is compounded by a decrease in labour demand resulting from
the fewer number of agents who are granted entrepreneurship.
7Those agents who do secure loans are more than compensated for the higher bribe
payments by a reduction in interest rates associated with a lower demand for credit.
4oﬀer greater scope for rent-seeking, or through a more blatant appropriation
of public funds in a manner that amounts to pure theft. All of these pitfalls
have been widely observed in practice and the scale of the oﬀenses is often
quite staggering.8 In short corruption in public policy can manifest in many
shapes and forms, all of which are conducive to fostering inequality by com-
promising the eﬀectiveness of programmes designed to alleviate poverty. Our
analysis aims to provide a simple illustration of this.
Another of our concerns is the relationship between corruption and growth.
Early research suggested that corruption might actually be growth-enhancing
by helping to circumvent institutional hurdles (red tape) in the bureaucratic
process: that is, bribes may act as “speed money” which bureaucrats accept
in return for by-passing cumbersome regulations that work against eﬃciency
(e.g., Huntington 1968; Leﬀ 1964; Leys 1970; Lui 1985).9 This view may
be challenged on both conceptual and empirical grounds, and the prevailing
wisdom is that corruption is detrimental to growth due to its adverse eﬀects
on resource allocations through the distortion of incentives and market sig-
nals.10 As above, however, there exists only a small body of theoretical work
that formalises the arguments involved. Recent examples include the con-
tributions of Ehrlich and Lui (1999) and Sarte (2000). The former develop
a model in which opportunities to proﬁt from bureaucratic malpractice cre-
ate incentives for individuals to compete for the privelage of holding public
oﬃce. These incentives lead to a diversion of resources away from growth-
promoting activities (investments in human capital) towards power-seeking
activities (investments in political capital). The latter constructs a frame-
work in which rent-seeking bureaucrats restrict the entry of ﬁrms into the
formal sector of the economy which has a better system of property rights
and law enforcement than the informal sector. When the costs of informality
8The single most extensive source of evidence is the World Bank’s web-site, referred
to in footnote 1. For an especially perplexing account of the experiences of many African
countries, see also www.freeafrica.org.
9More recently, Acemoglou and Verdier (1998) suggest that some degree of corruption
may be part of an optimal allocation in the presence of incomplete contracts since public
oﬃcials, though corrupt, can help in the enforcement of property rights. A similar idea
is expressed in Acemoglou and Verdier (2000) who argue more generally that corruption
may be the necessary price to pay for correcting market failures.
10Conceptually, there are two main arguments against the “speed money” hypothesis:
ﬁrst, although bribery may speed up individual transactions with bureaucrats, both the
sizes of bribes and the number of transactions may increase so as to produce an overall net
loss in eﬃciency; second, and more fundamentally, the distortions that bribes are meant
to mitigate are often the result of corrupt practices to begin with and should therefore be
treated as endogenous, rather than exogenous, to the bureaucratic process. Empirically,
the hypothesis is refuted by a large body of evidence, alluded to below.
5are high, growth is reduced relative to the free-entry case.
The above analyses are successful in explaining how corruption may im-
pact on growth without delving too deeply into questions as to why corrup-
tion might arise in the ﬁrst place and why corruption might either persist or
decline over time. These questions are important, especially given the wide
diversity of corruption levels across countries. There is a strong presumption
that the quality of governance not only inﬂuences, but is also inﬂuenced by,
the level of economic prosperity. The challenge for theorists is to explain this
two-way causality through an account of the joint, endogenous determina-
tion of corruption and development within the context of a single, unifying
framework. Our analysis intends to provide such an account.
The model that we use describes an artiﬁcial economy in which pri-
vate agents, or households, are divided into diﬀerent income classes. Public
agents, or bureaucrats, are charged with the responsibility for administering
government policy. Speciﬁcally, bureaucrats are authorised to collect taxes
and disburse subsidies in their execution of a redistributive programme de-
signed to beneﬁtt h ep o o r . 11 This authority allows bureaucrats to engage in
corrupt practices that are diﬃcult to monitor by the government. In par-
ticular, bureaucrats may conspire with wealthy households in bribery and
tax evasion: a bribe to a bureaucrat holds the promise that the income of a
household will be reported falsely and exempt from any tax.12 It is costly
for a bureaucrat to behave in this way and it is costly for the government
to detect such behaviour. This framework incorporates the essential fea-
tures that state intervention entails a delegation of powers to public oﬃcials,
that these powers may be abused in rent-seeking activities and that these
activities impose costs on society. Against this background, we show that
inequality is higher, while growth is lower, in a corrupt environment than
in a non-corrupt environment. The precise eﬀects of corruption are to re-
duce the level of subsidies (making all of the poor worse oﬀ), to enable scope
for tax evasion (making some of the rich better oﬀ), and to depress aggre-
gate savings (impeding the process of capital accumulation). In addition,
11We abstract from other instruments of public policy that may be used in poverty
alleviation, such as public goods and services. In our concluding remarks we indicate how
the model may be extended to incorporate these aspects (which would tend to strengthen
our results).
12This type of collusion between tax payers and tax oﬃcials forms the basis of several
microeconomic models of tax evasion (e.g., Besley and McLaren 1993; Chander and Wilde,
1992; Mookherjee and Png 1995). Arguably, corruption is most diﬃcult to detect - and
therefore most pervasive - when individuals act collusively in anticipation of mutual ben-
eﬁts that deter protest and dissent. This may be contrasted to the case of non-collusive
corruption, whereby one individual may stand to gain at the expense of another who may
then be inclined to report the oﬀense.
6we establish reverse causation: whether or not corruption occurs depends
on the level of economic activity. More precisely, there is a critical level of
capital below which corruption takes place and above which corruption is
absent. This gives rise to mutliple development regimes associated with dif-
ferent incidences of corruption and diﬀerent levels of inequality. Depending
on parameter values and initial conditions, transition between these regimes
may or may not be feasible. In the absence of transition, there are multiple
long-run equilibria, including a poverty trap equilibrium in which corruption
and inequality remain permanently high. These properties of the model allow
us to explain why the extent of corruption, inequality and poverty appear to
vary so markedly and persistently around the world.13
The implications of our analysis are consistent with recent empirical ev-
idence acquired from econometric investigations using various cross-country
data sets. Several studies have identiﬁed a strong positive correlation between
the incidence of corruption and the degree of income inequality. Gyimah-
Brempong (2003), using a panel of African countries, estimates sizeable in-
creases in the Gini coeﬃcient as the level of corruption increases. The same
ﬁnding appears in the contributions of Gupta et al. (2002) and Li et al.
(2000), each of which is based on a broader sample of both developed and
developing countries. In the case of the latter, it is also found that corrup-
tion accounts for a substantial proportion of the Gini diﬀerential between
the poor and rich regions of the world. Foellmi and Oechslin (2003) present
additional results which suggest that an increase in the level of corruption
leads to an increase in the income share of the wealthiest members of the
population. Equally convincing is the empirical testimony of a strong nega-
tive relationship between corruption and development. A number of authors
- including Gyimah-Brempong (2003), Keefer and Knack (1997), Knack and
Keefer (1995), Li et al. (2000), Mauro (1995) and Sachs and Warner (1997) -
estimate signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects of corruption on growth. These and other
studies also provide evidence on various ways in which corruption might take
13More traditional explanations appeal to cross-country diﬀerences in institutions, reg-
ulations and social customs that inﬂuence opportunities for engaging in corrupt practices
and that shape public attitudes towards these practices. Such arguments have been crit-
icised for being almost tautological and for failing to account for real-world observations
(e.g., Bardhan 1997). Another explanation, grounded more ﬁrmly on economic principles,
is based on the notion of frequency-dependent equilibria, according to which corruption at
the group level is a key determinant of corruption at the individual level (e.g., Andvig and
Moene 1990; Cadot 1987). This account may be questioned for leaving too much to chance:
whether or not corruption occurs depends primarily on whether or not it is expected to
occur. Our own analysis is rather more informative in the sense that it reveals how the
limiting outcome of the economy depends predictably on fundamentals (preferences and
technologies).
7hold, such as lowering rates of investment (e.g., Mauro 1995), creating ob-
stacles to doing business (e.g., World Bank 2002), reducing inﬂows of foreign
investment (e.g., Wei 2000) and causing misallocations of public expenditures
(e.g., Mauro 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). The notion that causality may
r u ni nt h eo p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o ni se v i d e nced in many other analyses, including
Ades and Di Tella (1999), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Frechette (2001), Mon-
tinola and Jackman (1999), Paldam (2002), Rauch and Evans (2000) and
Treisman (2000). The general conclusion from these analyses is that a signif-
icant proportion of the variations in corruption indices can be explained by
variations in per-capita income levels. In addition, the idea that corruption
and poverty may co-exist as persistent, rather than transient, phenomena,
is suggested by the casual observation that many of the most poor and cor-
rupt countries of the past are among the most poor and corrupt countries
of today (e.g., Bardhan 1997). Finally, we note the empirical ﬁnding that,
as predicted by our analysis, incomes appear to be more equally distributed
in wealthier economies (e.g., Ravallion and Chen 1997; World Bank 1990,
1991).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
describe the set-up of the economy. In Section 3 we identify conditions under
which corruption occurs. In Section 4 we address the issue of corruption and
inequality. In Section 5 we turn to the study of corruption and development.
In Section 6 we make a few a concluding remarks.
2T h e E n v i r o n m e n t
Time is discrete and indexed by t =0 ,..,∞. There is a constant population
of two-period-lived agents belonging to overlapping generations of dynastic
families. Agents of each generation are divided into two groups of citizens -
private individuals (or households), of whom there is a ﬁxed measure of mass
M, and public servants (or bureaucrats), of whom there is a ﬁxed measure of
mass N<M .14 Households work for ﬁrms in the production of output, while
bureaucrats work for the government in the administration of ﬁscal policy.
Households are diﬀerentiated according to diﬀerences in their incomes which
14We assume that agents are diﬀerentiated at birth according to their abilities and
skills. A population of M agents lack the skills necessary to become bureaucrats, while a
population of N agents posess these skills. The latter are induced to become bureaucrats
by an allocation of talent condition established below. Thus, as in other analyses (e.g.,
Ehrlich and Lui 1999; Sarte 2000), we abstract from issues relating to occupational choice.
In doing so we are able to simplify the analysis by not having to consider possible changes
in the size of the bureaucracy and possible changes in the level of corruption that may
result from this.
8imply diﬀerences in their propensities to be taxed or subsidised. Bureaucrats
are diﬀerentiated according to diﬀerences in their proclivities towards rent-
seeking.15 Corruption arises from the incentive of a (corruptible) bureaucrat
to conspire with a (taxable) household in concealing information (the house-
hold’s income) from the government. In doing this, the bureaucrat expects
to gain from his acceptance of a bribe, while the household expects to gain
from its evasion of tax. All agents are risk neutral, working (and saving)
only when young and consuming only when old. Firms, of which there is a
unit mass, hire labour from households and rent capital from all agents in
perfectly competitive markets.
2.1 The Government
We assume that the government redistributes wealth from the rich to the poor
by means of taxes and subsidies. The tax on each rich (high-income) house-
hold is denoted by τt, and the subsidy to each poor (low-income) household
is denoted by σt. Responsibility for the collection of taxes and disbursement
of subsidies lies with bureaucrats using the authority delegated to them by
the government. For simplicity, we assume that bureaucrats are neither li-
able to pay taxes nor eligible to receive subsidies. The government sets the
salaries of bureaucrats in accordance with the following considerations. Any
bureaucrat (whether corruptible or non-corruptible) can work for a ﬁrm to
receive an income equal to the wage paid to households. Any bureaucrat
who is willing to accept a salary less than this wage must be expecting to
receive compensation through bribery and is therefore immediately identiﬁed
as being corrupt. As in other analyses (e.g., Acemoglou and Verdier 1998),
we assume that a bureaucrat who is discovered to be corrupt is subject to the
maximum ﬁne of having all of his income conﬁscated. Given this, then no
corruptible bureaucrat would ever reveal himself in the way described above.
As such, the government can minimise its labour costs, while ensuring com-
plete bureaucratic participation, by setting the salaries of all bureaucrats
equal to the wage paid by ﬁrms to households.16
15Such diﬀerences may reﬂect diﬀerences in proﬁciencies at being corrupt or diﬀerences
in moral attitudes towards being corrupt (e.g., Acemoglou and Verdier 2000; Besley and
McLaren 1993; Tirole 1996). The main purpose of this assumption is to allow us to
determine the wages of bureaucrats in a relatively straightforward way that does not
demand additional assumptions about how public sector pay is determined. In fact, all
we need for this purpose is that there be at least one bureaucrat who is non-corruptible -
all other bureaucrats may well be potential transgressors.
16This has the usual interpretation of an allocation of talent condition. The government
cannot force any of the N potential bureaucrats to actually take up public oﬃce, but it is
able to induce all of them to do so by paying what they would earn elsewhere.
9Since the government knows how much tax revenue is due in the ab-
sence of corruption (since it knows the number of taxable households and
since it is responsible for setting taxes), any shortfall of revenue below this
amount reveals that corruption is occurring. Under such circumstances, the
government investigates the behaviour of bureaucrats using a costly and im-
precise monitoring technology. This technology entails e units of additional
expenditure and implies that a bureaucrat who is corrupt faces a probability,
p ∈ (0,1), of avoiding detection, and a probability, 1 − p,o fb e i n gf o u n d
out. The tax-evading household with whom the bureaucrat conspires faces
the same probabilities of remaining anonymous and being exposed. In the
event of the latter, the household is forced to pay its full tax liability.
The government runs a continuously balanced budget by equating its total
revenues to its total expenditures. From above, the former consist of the taxes
paid by high-income households plus the ﬁnes paid by any bureaucrats who
are caught being corrupt, while the latter include the salaries of bureaucrats
and the costs of monitoring in the event of corruption. For given values of
these items, the level of subsidies is determined residually so as to ensure
that the government’s budget constraint is satisﬁed.
2.2 Households
The population of households is distributed across three income classes.
There is a fraction, µl ∈ (0,1),o fl o w - i n c o m e( l-type) households, a frac-
tion, µm ∈ (0,1), of middle-income (m-type) households and a remaining
fraction, µh =1− µl − µm, of high-income (h-type) households. Diﬀerences
in incomes reﬂect diﬀerences in labour endowments which households supply
inelastically to ﬁrms in return for a wage of wt.17 Speciﬁcally, a household
belongs to income class i (= l,m,h)i fi ti se n d o w e dw i t hλi units of labour
(implying wage earnings of λiwt), where λl <λ m <λ h.O n l y l o w - i n c o m e
households are eligible to receive subsidies and only high-income households
a r el i a b l et op a yt a x e s .T h eo ﬃcial amount of tax that must be paid is de-
termined by the linear tax rule τt = τ(λhwt − z),w h e r ez is an amount of
income that is exempt from tax. The total ﬁnal income (or savings) of each
type of household is denoted by sit which is converted into capital and rented
out to ﬁrms at the interest rate rt+1. For the purposes of the present analysis,
we assume that the identity of a low-income household is public knowledge,
but that the identity of a middle- or high-income household is private infor-
mation. This assumption is suﬃcient to admit the possibility of corruption,
17Alternatively, one may diﬀerentiate households according to diﬀerences in skills (low-
skilled, semi-skilled and high-skilled), and allow wages to vary accordingly.
10whilst also serving to simplify the analysis by limiting the scope for corrupt
behaviour. In particular, it allows corruption to occur in the evasion of taxes,
but not in the appropriation of subsidies. Thus, by bribing a bureaucrat, a
high-income household may seek to evade taxes by having itself reported to
the government as a middle-income type. It cannot, however, seek to enrich
itself further by laying claim to a subsidy through its misrepresentation as a
low-income type (and neither can a middle-income household do this).18
A household derives lifetime utility, uit,a c c o r d i n gt ouit =( 1+rt+1)sit −
qit+1+v(qit+1),w h e r eqit+1 denotes bequests to oﬀspring and v(·) is a strictly
concave function that satisﬁes the usual Inada conditions.19 The role of
bequests in our model is merely to ensure the existence of a non-degenerate
steady state equilibrium associated with a linear (rather than concave) capital
accumulation path. For this reason, we choose the simplest motivation for
bequests, which is the ‘warm-glow’, or ‘joy-of-giving’ motive. Evidently, since
utility is maximised by setting v0(·)=1 , then the optimal size of bequest is
the same for each household and is ﬁxed from one generation to the next:
that is, qit+1 = q for all i and all t.
Given the above, we may compute the total ﬁnal income, or wealth, of
each type of household as follows. For a low-income type, total wealth is
equal to the value of own income, λlwt + q, plus the value of subsidies, σt.
For a middle-income type, total wealth is equal to just the value of own
income, λmwt + q. For a high-income type, wealth status is more a matter
of choice, being determined by the household’s decision as to whether or
not to conspire with a bureaucrat in bribery and tax evasion. If not, then
ﬁnal wealth is equal to the value of own income, λhwt + q,l e s st h ev a l u eo f
taxes, τ(λhwt − z).I fs o ,t h e nﬁnal wealth is uncertain and depends on the
amount of bribe paid and the probability of being caught. Let bt denote the
bribe. With probability p, the household and bureaucrat succeed in their
conspiracy, implying that the household obtains λhwt + q, less bt.W i t h
probability 1 − p, their collusion is exposed, meaning that the household
retains the same amount, less τ(λhwt−z). In conclusion, we may summarise
the proﬁle of household incomes as
18Allowing for such a possibility would tend to strengthen our results by increasing the
scope for corrupt behaviour. The same would be true if bureaucrats could capture rents by
demanding bribes from low-income households in return for subsidies. Again, this does not
arise in our model because the government knows the identities of these households and
the incomes to which they are entitled: any bureaucrat who was to make such a demand
could simply be reported to the government, leading to his immediate apprehension and
prosecution.
19Thus (1 + rt+1)sit − qit+1 is the consumption of a household when old.
11slt = λlwt + σt + q, (1)





(1 − τ)λhwt + τz+ q if bt =0 ,
λhwt − bt + q with prob. p if bt > 0,
(1 − τ)λhwt + τz− bt + q with prob. 1 − p if bt > 0.
(3)
Throughout our analysis, we assume appropriate restrictions on parameter
values to ensure that subsidies are always positive (i.e., σt > 0 for all t), whilst
precluding the possibility of any household changing income class purely as
a result of redistributive policy.
2.3 Bureaucrats
The population of bureaucrats is divided into a fraction, ν, of unknown cor-
ruptible (c-type) bureaucrats and a remaining fraction, 1 − ν of unknown
non-corruptible (n-type) bureaucrats. By deﬁnition, the former are suscepti-
ble to bribery, while the latter are not. Each bureaucrat is endowed with one
unit of labour which he supplies inelastically to the government in return
for a salary. As indicated earlier, this salary is set equal to the wage, wt,
that the bureaucrat could earn from supplying his labour to ﬁrms, instead.
For simplicity, we assume that a bureaucrat has no other source of income
(i.e., income from parental bequests).20 The total ﬁnal income (or savings)
of a bureaucrat is denoted by sjt (j = c,n) ,e a r n i n gar a t eo fr e t u r no frt+1
when converted into capital and rented out to ﬁrms. As an administrator
of the government’s policy of redistribution, each bureaucrat has jurisdiction
over
µhM
N high-income households, from which he collects taxes, and
µlM
N
low-income households, to which he gives subsidies.
The total incomes of bureaucrats are deduced as follows. For a non-
corruptible bureaucrat, total income is simply equal to earnings from labour,
wt. For a corruptible bureaucrat, total income is determined according to
whether or not corruption is engaged in. If not, then the bureaucrat re-
ceives just his labour earnings, wt, as before. If so, then the bureaucrat’s
ﬁnal wealth depends on the amount of bribes received, the chances of being
caught, the resources spent on trying to avoid detection and the penalties
incurred if rent-seeking is exposed. In general, corrupt individuals, in or-
der to remain inconspicuous, may hide their illegal income, may invest this
20As also indicated earlier, we assume for additional convenience that bureaucrats are
exempt from paying taxes and illegible to receive subsidies. This assumption may be
justiﬁed by supposing that the unit labour endowment of bureaucrats places them in a
similar labour income position as middle-income households.
12income diﬀerently from legal income and may alter their patterns of expen-
diture. These activities typically entail costs in one form or another. For
the purposes of the present analysis, we make the simple assumption that a
bureaucrat who is corrupt needs to spend resources on trying to conceal his
behaviour if he is to stand any chance of not being caught. It is plausible to
imagine that more resources must be spent to conceal more illegal income.





is the total value of bribes that the bureaucrat receives. With probability
p, the bureaucrat succeeds in his deception and retains the net value of his
salary and rents, wt + Bt − β(Bt). With probability 1 − p, the bureaucrat
is apprehended and left with nothing. It follows that the income proﬁle of
bureaucrats may be summarised as





wt if bt =0 ,
wt + Bt − β(Bt) with prob. p if bt > 0,
0 with prob. 1 − p if bt > 0.
(5)
2.4 Firms
The representative ﬁrm combines xt units of labour with kt units of capital








(A>0,α∈ (0,1))w h e r eKt denotes the aggregate stock of capital.21 The
ﬁrm hires labour from households at the competitively-determined wage rate
wt and rents capital from all agents at the competitively-determined rental










t .S i n c e xt = x =( λlµl + λmµm + λhµh)M and kt = Kt in
equilibrium, we may write these conditions as
wt = Aαx
α−1kt, (7)
rt = r = A(1 − α)x
α, (8)
Thus equilibrium wages are proportional to the capital stock, while the equi-
librium interest rate is constant.
21This aggregate externality - a common feature of endogenous growth models - allows
us to work with a simple AK technology, where the social returns to capital are constant.
Our results would be unchanged were we to assume diminishing returns to capital instead.
133 T h eI n c e n t i v et ob eC o r r u p t
Corruption occurs if a high-income household and a corruptible bureaucrat
ﬁnd it mutually advantageous (or non-disadvantangeous) to conspire with
each other in concealing information from the government. Under such cir-
cumstances, there is bribery and tax evasion. In what follows we study the
individual incentives of private and public agents to behave in this way.22
For a corruptible bureaucrat, the expected return from accepting a bribe
is deduced from (5) as E(sct|bt > 0) = p[wt + Bt − β(Bt)]. This return is
maximised by setting β
0(·)=1 , implying an optimal ﬁxed amount of bribe
income, Bt = B∗, and a corresponding optimal ﬁxed size of bribe, bt = b∗,
for all t. The bureaucrat’s expected return from not accepting a bribe is also
obtained from (5) as E(sct|bt =0 )=wt.I f E(sct|bt > 0) ≥ E(sct|bt =0 ) ,
then the bureaucrat has an incentive to be corrupt. For the case in which
bt = b∗, this condition may be stated as
p[B
∗ − β(B
∗)] ≥ (1 − p)wt. (9)
Intuitively, a bureaucrat is more likely to be corrupt the less he expects to
lose in legal income if he is caught.
For a high-income household, the expected returns from paying and not
paying a bribe are computed from (3) as E(sht|bt > 0) = [1−(1−p)τ]λhwt+
(1−p)τz−bt +q and E(sht|bt =0 )=( 1−τ)λhw+τz+q, respectively. The
household has an incentive to oﬀer a bribe if E(sht|bt > 0) ≥ E(sht|bt =0 ) .
This condition may be written as
bt ≤ pτ(λhwt − z). (10)
Intuitively, the household is preparedt ob r i b eab u r e a u c r a tb yn om o r et h a n
w h a ti te x p e c t st os a v ei nt a x e s .
Observe that, if (10) is satisﬁed for bt = b∗, then the household is willing
to pay the bureaucrat his optimal bribe. Moreover, if b∗ ≤ pτ(λhw0 − z),
then the household is always willing to do this since wt >w 0 for all t.23 For
the purposes of simplifying our subsequent analysis, we assume that this is
the case. Under such circumstances, the condition for corruption to occur
is given solely by the condition in (9), being determined exclusively by the
incentives of corruptible bureaucrats.24
22In doing this, we recall that all agents are risk neutral, deriving linear utility from
their income (or savings) - that is, (1 + r)sjt for bureaucrats and (1 + r)sit − q + v(q) for
households. It follows that expected utility is maximised by choosing whatever action is
appropriate to maximise expected income.
23This follows from (7) which implies that wages increase with capital accumulation,
starting from an initial stock of capital, k0.
24Evidently, our analysis implies that either all or none of these bureaucrats will be
144 Corruption and Inequality
The distribution of income in the economy is determined by the system of
taxes and subsidies used to transfer resources from high-income households
to low-income households. This system is administered by bureaucrats using
the authority delegated to them by the government. As shown above, some
of these public oﬃcials may be tempted to abuse their authoritative powers
by colluding with potential tax payers in the concealment and fabrication
of information. Our objective below is to demonstrate how such behaviour
can undermine the eﬀectiveness of public policy in redistributing wealth and
reducing inequality.
Consider, ﬁrst, the case in which corruption is absent, meaning that the
condition in (9) is violated. Each and every bureaucrat, of whom there are




τ(λhwt − z),f r o m
those high-income households under his jurisdiction and returns all of this
revenue to the government. The total proceeds from taxation are used by the
government to ﬁnance its total expenditures on the salaries of bureaucrats,
Nwt, and subsidies to low-income households, µlMσt. The amount of subsidy
that each of these households receives, denoted b σt, is determined from the
government’s budget constraint as
µlMb σt = µhMτ(λhwt − z) − Nwt. (11)
Given (11), the ﬁnal incomes of households are established from (1), (2) and
(3) (excluding the case in which bribe payments are positive). Let b π(st)
denote the population of households with an income of st. Then the distri-






µlM for st = λlwt + b σt + q ≡ b slt,
µmM for st = λmwt + q ≡ b smt,
µhM for st =( 1− τ)λhwt + τz+ q ≡ b sht.
(12)
Now consider the case in which corruption exists as a result of the con-
dition in (9) being satisiﬁed. The total population of corrupt bureaucrats
is νN, of whom a fraction, p, evade detection by the government, while the
remaining fraction, 1−p, are caught. The government’s tax receipts are zero




τ(λhwt −z) from each of the latter who is
also ﬁned the amount wt + B∗ − β(B∗). From each non-corrupt bureaucrat,




τ(λhwt − z) in
corrupt. This is a simpliﬁcation of little consequence to our main results. In our concluding
remarks, we indicate how the model could be extended to allow for smooth variations in
the incidence of corruption.
15tax revenue. In addition to its outlays on bureaucrats’ salaries, Nwt,a n d
subsidies, µlMσt,t h eg o v e r n m e n td e v o t e se units of expenditure to monitor-
ing. As above, the amount of subsidy paid to each low-income household,
denoted e σt, may be computed from the government’s budget constraint as
µlMe σt =( 1− pν)µhMτ(λhwt − z) − [1 − (1 − p)ν]Nwt
+( 1− p)νN[B
∗ − β(B
∗)] − e, (13)
Given (13), the ﬁnal incomes of households are deduced from (1), (2) and
(3) (including the case in which bribe payments are positive). Continuing
as before, denote by e π(st) t h ep o p u l a t i o no fh o u s e h o l d sw i t ha ni n c o m eo f
st. Note that the fraction of high-income households that pay (do not pay)
bribes is equal to ν (1−ν), the fraction of bureacrats who are corrupt (non-
corrupt). Note also that a proportion, p (1 − p), of bribe-paying households
succeed (fail) in their attempts to evade taxes. It follows that the distribution
of household income in this corrupt environment is given by
e π(·)=

    
    
µlM for st = λlwt + e σt + q ≡ e slt,
µmM for st = λmwt + q ≡ e smt,
(1 − ν)µhM for st =( 1− τ)λhwt + τz+ q ≡ e s1
ht,
pνµhM for st = λhwt − b∗ + q ≡ e s2
ht,
(1 − p)νµhM for st =( 1− τ)λhwt + τz− b∗ + q ≡ e s3
ht.
(14)
A comparison of (11) and (13) reveals that




∗)] − (1 − p)wt} − νNβ(B
∗) − e (15)
Recall that, in the case of corruption, both of the conditions in (9) and (10)
are satisﬁed. Consequently, the above expression yields the unambiguous
result that e σt < b σt: that is, for any given wage, the amount of subsidy re-
ceived by each low-income household is lower under corruption than under
non-corruption. This follows from the fact that corruption entails both a loss
of revenue to the government from the evasion of taxes by high-income house-
holds and an additional outlay for the government from the costly monitoring
of bureaucratic behaviour. Although the government earns some extra rev-
enue from ﬁnes, the net eﬀect of bureaucratic malfeasance is to reduce the
amount of resources available for subsidies.
Given the above, we may deduce precisely how corruption aﬀects the
distribution of income as follows. Naturally, corruption has no bearing on
the wealth status of middle-income households (e smt = b smt), of which there
is a total mass of µmM. By contrast, all low-income households, the mass of
16which is µlM, are made worse oﬀ by corruption (e slt < b slt) due to the lower
level of subsidies (e σt < b σt). As regards the wealth status of high-income
households, the consequences of corruption are more varied: there is a mass
of these households, (1−ν)µhM, that deal with non-corruptible bureaucrats
and that are unaﬀected by corruption (e s1
ht = b sht); there is another mass of
these households, pνµhM, that deal with corruptible bureaucrats and that
a r em a d eb e t t e ro ﬀ (e s2
ht > b sht) by succeeding in their attempts to evade taxes;
and there is a remaining mass of these households, (1 − p)νµhM,t h a ta l s o
deal with corruptible bureaucrats but that are made worse oﬀ (e s3
ht < b sht)
by failing in their attempts to evade taxes. Based on these observations,
we present Figure 1 as an illustration of how the distribution of income in
a non-corrupt environment compares with the distribution of income in a
corrupt environment. Evidently, the latter displays greater variation than
the former. In particular, by making all low-income households worse oﬀ
and some high-income households better oﬀ, corruption stretches out the
distribution in both directions so as to widen the gap between the rich and
poor. In short, corruption impedes the functioning of redistributive policy
and, in doing so, increases the degree of income inequality.25
5 Corruption and Development
The foregoing analysis presents a snapshot of events at any point in time
under one of two possible scenarios - the case in which all corruptible bu-
reaucrats are corrupt and the case in which no corruptible bureaucrat is cor-
rupt. Whichever of these scenarios transpires is governed by the condition
in (9). For any given level of wages, wt, an economy in which this condition
is satisﬁed will display greater income inequality than an economy in which
the condition is violated. In what follows, we present a similar analysis that
focuses on the eﬀects of corruption on capital accumulation and growth. In
addition, we demonstrate how corruption, itself, is inﬂuenced by the level of
economic activity, or level of economic development. This arises from the
fact that wages are not exogenous nor ﬁxed in our model. On the contrary,
25The same result would hold if one was to look at expected (rather than actual) incomes.
This would make a diﬀerence only in the case of tax-evading households, for which E(e sht) >
E(b sht) (meaning that each of these households is better oﬀ under corruption in expected
value terms). Additionally, it is worth noting that the income distribution of bureaucrats
is also made more unequal by corruption. Only non-corrupt bureaucrats (of whom there
are (1−ν)N) earn the same amount of income (wt) as all bureaucrats earn in the absence
of corruption. Of the population of corrupt bureaucrats, there are some (pνN)w h oe a r n
more income (wt + B∗ − β(B∗))a n do t h e r s( (1 − p)vN) who earn less (zero) income by
accepting bribes. As above, each one is better oﬀ in expected value terms.
17they are determined endogenously with other economic outcomes along the
dynamic path of capital accumulation. Accordingly, corruption and devel-
opment are linked together in a relationship that is fundamentally two-way
causal.
The path of capital accumulation is determined using the equilibrium
condition that the total demand for capital by ﬁr m si se q u a lt ot h et o t a l
savings of all agents. The total value of savings in the absence and presence
of corruption is computed straightforwardly from the income (savings) dis-
tributions of households in (12) and (14), together with the corresponding
distributions for bureaucrats.26 After substituting for wages using (7), as
well as subsidies using (11) and (13), we ﬁnd that capital accumulation in a
non-corrupt environment is described by
b kt+1 = Aαx
αkt + Mq ≡ b κ(kt), (16)
while capital accumulation in a corrupt environment is given by
e kt+1 = Aαx
αkt + Mq− νNβ(B
∗) − e ≡ e κ(kt), (17)
Appropriate parameter restrictions ensure that each of these transition paths
displays a unique, stable steady state equilibrium at some positive level of
capital. This stationary point is deﬁned by b k = b κ(b k) i nt h ec a s eo f( 1 6 )
and by e k = e κ(e k) in the case of (17).27 It is evident that, for any given kt,
e κ(·) < b κ(·).A ss u c h ,e k<b k as well. These results show the negative eﬀect
of corruption on growth and development. The size of this eﬀect depends on
the amount by which resources are used up in the concealment and detection
of corrupt behaviour (captured by the terms νNβ(·) and e, respectively, in
(17)).
As indicated above, our model predicts that corruption not only inﬂu-
ences, but is also inﬂuenced by, economic development. To see this, use the
expression for wt in (7) to write the condition in (9) as
kt ≤
p(B∗ − β(B∗))
(1 − p)αAxα−1 ≡ k. (18)
Accordingly, there is a critical level of capital, k, below which corruption
e x i s t sa n da b o v ew h i c hc o r r u p t i o ni sa b s e n t . T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a t
higher levels of capital, associated with higher wages of all agents, imply
26See footnote 25.
27The parameter restrictions are Aαxα ∈ (0,1) (ensuring uniqueness and stability in
both cases) and Mq − νNβ(·) − e>0 (ensuring non-degeneracy in both cases). The
steady state levels of capital are b k =
Mq
1−Aαxα and e k =
Mq−νNβ(·)−e
1−Aαxα .
18higher costs to bureaucrats if they are caught being corrupt. At suﬃcently
large values of kt, these costs are prohibitive and the incentive to be corrupt
disappears.
Given the above, we present Figure 2 as a complete characterisation of
the economy’s dynamic general equilibrium. Assuming that k<b k (otherwise
the analysis is trivial), one may distinguish between two types of develop-
ment regime: the ﬁrst - a low development regime (for which kt < k)-i s
characterised by relatively low levels of economic activity, accompanied by
relatively high levels of corruption and inequality; the second - a high devel-
opment regime (for which kt > k) - is characterised by relatively high levels
of economic activity, accompanied by relatively low levels of corruption and
inequality. The overall evolution of the economy depends essentially on the
relationship between k and e k,t o g e t h e rw i t hk0 (the initial stock of capital).
Suppose that k0 < k<e k. In this case the economy starts oﬀ in a situation
where all corruptible bureacrats are corrupt and development takes place
along the low capital accumulation path, e κ(·). The existence of widespread
corruption impedes the eﬀectiveness of public policy in redistributing wealth
s ot h a tt h ed e g r e eo fi n c o m ei n e q u a l i t yr e m a i n sr e l a t i v e l yh i g h . A ts o m e
point in time, kt reaches k and the incentive for each corruptible bureaucrat
to continue being corrupt disappears. This propels the economy onto the
high capital accumulation path, b κ(·), after which it converges to the high
steady state equilibrium, b k. With corruption now absent, redistributive pol-
icy works more eﬀectively, leading to a more equal income distribution. This
chain of events describes a process of transition from the low development
regime to the high development regime. But there is nothing in the model
to guarantee such an outcome. To be sure, suppose that k0 < e k<k.U n d e r
such circumstances, the economy is destined for the low steady state equi-
librium, e k, being locked forever on the low capital accumulation path, e κ(·),
and being mired forever with widespread corruption that fosters inequalities.
To the extent that the high steady state equilibrium, b k, would be attained
if k0 > k, the model now presents a situation in which limiting outcomes
depend fundamentally on initial conditions.
The existence of mutliple long-run equlilbria means that countries with
essentially the same structural characteristics, but diﬀerent initial conditions,
m a yf a c ev e r yd i ﬀerent prospects in terms of their economic development and
quality of governance. In terms of the above, these prospects would look de-
cidedly bleak for countries located below the threshold point k,u n l e s st h e r e
was the possibility of a fundamental adjustment that could produce a sud-
den turn of events. One such possibility is a windfall increase in the stock of
capital that might allow the threshold to be breached. Another is a change
19in the value of some key structural parameter that may cause a favourable
shift in the transition function and the threshold, itself. Yet even allowing for
these events, it may still be diﬃcult for some countries to escape from their
predicament: switching from a state of low development to a state of high
development is a prospect that is more within the reach of those economies
located relatively close to the threshold than those that lie relatively far away
from it. In addition, if countries do not share the same structural characteris-
tics, then there would be a distribution of transition paths and a distribution
of limiting outcomes that would reﬂect similar divisions between poor and
rich countries. These observations suggest that cross-country diﬀerences in
development, inequality and corruption may be persistent, rather than tran-
sitory, ﬁxtures of the global economy.
6 Conclusions
Corruption may be diﬃcult to deﬁne and measure precisely, but there is no
doubt that it exists and no question that it has harmful eﬀects. The fact
that the most corrupt countries in the world tend also to display the most
poverty and inequality is more than just a coincidence. Corruption can cause
both a wastage and a misallocation of resources that work against eﬃciency
and equality. In doing so, it can sabotage the prospects for growth and
widen the gap between the rich and the poor. At the same time, corruption
tends to ﬂourish in less developed societies, where institutional structures
are fragile and the returns to legitimate economic activity are small. Under
such circumstances, the incentives that drive corrupt behaviour are often
strong and cohesive, while the forces that oppose it are usually weak and
fragmented. These observations are not new, but they have only recently
become the subject of systematic formal investigation by economists. Our
intention in this paper has been to take a further step in the same direction.
Our analysis has focused on corruption in public policy which is generally
seen as one of the major causes of inequality and underdevelopment. Indeed,
when such corruption exists, there may be a world of diﬀerence between
what policies are intended by a government and what policies are actually
implemented. The latter may have much less to do with the promotion of
growth and reduction of poverty, and much more to do with the personal
enrichment of a privelaged few pursuing their own hidden agenda. Bribery,
fraud and theft on the part of policy administrators may not only interfere
with development objectives, but may also undermine plans for redistribu-
tion. While the eﬀects may be widespread throughout society, it is the poor
who suﬀer the most: it is the poor who are hit hardest by economic decline
20and stagnation, who are least able to give kickbacks for services to which
they are entitled and who are most reliant on social programmes that may
be jeopardised by misgovernance.
For simplicity, we have conﬁned our analysis to the case in which re-
distribution takes place through a system of direct transfers in the form of
taxes and subsidies. In principle the analysis could be extended to incorpo-
rate other instruments of public policy that serve to alleviate poverty. Not
least of these are public goods and services designed to beneﬁtl o w - i n c o m e
households. Typical examples are publicly-funded programmes on education,
training and health on which the poorest members of society rely the most.
Such programmes can improve the economic circumstances of the poor by
raising their human capital not only in terms of knowledge and expertise, but
also in terms of health status and life expectancy. At the same time, both
the quantity and quality of public services can suﬀer as a result of bureau-
cratic corruption for reasons alluded to earlier. We may capture these ideas
in a simple and tractable way by allowing the productivities of households
in diﬀerent income classes to depend more or less strongly on the provision
of public goods which lies in the hands of bureaucrats. To the extent that
such dependence decreases with the level of income, then any type of corrupt
practice - be it tax evasion, job-shirking or theft - that reduces public goods
provision will reduce the wages of the poor relative to the non-poor. This
would reinforce our results by providing another mechanism through which
corruption in public policy fosters inequality.
Another simplifying feature of our analysis is that the incidence of cor-
ruption emerges as a binary variable that takes on either a high value or a low
value, depending on whether all corruptible bureaucrats are either corrupt
or non-corrupt. An implication of this is that, if transition between develop-
ment regimes takes place, then it does so abruptly (discontinuously) as soon
as the threshold level, k, is reached. As above, it is possible to extend the
model to allow for smooth variations in the incidence of corruption along a
continuous capital accumulation path. For example, if the costs of conceal-
ing illegal income (the function β(·))d i ﬀered among bureacrats, then so too
would the sizes of bribes and so too would the incentives to accept bribes.
Under such circumstances, not all corrupt bureaucrats would cease being
corrupt at the same time: only those for whom p[B∗ − β(B∗)] < (1 − p)wt
would do so. Ceteris paribus, as capital accumulation proceeds, this condi-
tion would become satisﬁed for a growing number of bureaucrats, implying
a gradual decrease in corrupt activity. Depending on parameter values, the
limiting outcome of the economy might be one in which this activity is at a
mimimum, a maximum or somewhere in between.
The predictions of our analysis accord well with empirical evidence: cor-
21ruption is positively correlated with income inequality and negatively cor-
related with economic development. Moreover, we are able to explain how
corruption and poverty may reinforce each other to become permanent char-
acteristics of an economy. As stated at the beginning of this paper, the World
Bank has singled out corruption as being a major obstacle to economic and
social development. Our analysis may be seen as providing formal support
for this view.
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